Abstract: This study investigated whether demographic variables, efficacy beliefs, visions, and worries are associated with four different forms of (dis)engagement with the European Union (EU): intended voting in the 2019 EU elections, nonconventional political engagement, psychological engagement, and the wish that one's own country should leave the EU. The sample comprised 3,764 young people aged 16-25 years living in seven European countries: Albania, Austria, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain, and the UK. Economic challenges, human rights, and the environment were the most important future visions; unemployment and poverty, climate change, civil unrests, and collapse of the EU were the most important future worries. The four forms of (dis)engagement with the EU were differentially associated with predictors, although internal efficacy and future vision of economic challenges predicted all forms. Implications for future EU policy are discussed.
The European Union (EU) has recently faced several fundamental challenges that have put the question of the future of the European project on the political agenda. There is no doubt that today's young people will shape the future of Europe in the long run -but are their voices being heard today? What visions and worries do young people have for the future of Europe? Do young people think they can influence political decisions on the European level? Do young people's efficacy beliefs, visions, and worries translate into engagement with the EU?
The Europe 2038 project 1 was designed to answer these questions, and a large-scale Pan-European survey was conducted with youth aged 16-25 years. To maximize the generalizability of the findings, seven European countries with differing relationships to the EU participated in this project.
everyday lives than politics on a local level such as neighborhoods or cities (Barrett & Zani, 2015b; Šerek, Lacinova & Macek, 2012) . This is especially true for high stakes decisions (like Brexit) that might have an unforeseeable impact on the future of many people. There are different ways that youth can engage with supranational entities like the EU (Zani & Barrett, 2012) , including conventional political participation (e.g., voting in EU elections), nonconventional political participation (e.g., signing petitions to try and influence European institutions, processes, or decisionmaking), and psychological engagement with the EU (e.g., following the news about European issues or discussing European topics with friends). Young people might also be disengaged, wanting their country to leave the EU. This type of disengagement has been conceptualized as a form of disidentification (Becker & Tausch, 2014) , and called "exit" in a recent study (Prodromitis, Chryssochoou, & Papastamou, 2017) . These four different forms of supranational (dis)engagement are expressions of young people's wish to shape the future of Europe either in the public or private sphere (Amnå & Ekman, 2015) or by individual or collective actions (Amnå, 2012; Ekman & Amnå, 2012) . Listening to young people's voices and understanding the factors associated with different forms of supranational (dis)engagement is also important given the imbalance of power and control in favor of older groups (Albanesi, Mazzoni, Cicognani, & Zani, 2015) .
Understanding Young People's Engagement With the EU
To the best of our knowledge, no study to date has investigated these four different forms of young people's (dis)engagement with the EU and no conceptual model has been developed to understand young people's engagement on a supranational political level. However, Cicognani and Zani (2015) proposed a psychosocial model of participation, identifying seven factors associated with engagement and participation:
(1) personal and demographic, (2) social construction of participation, (3) motivations and goals, (4) emotions, (5) social identities and sense of belonging, (6) perceived power and influence, and (7) perceived opportunities and barriers. Barrett (2015) also constructed an integrative model of political and civic participation, identifying different factors associated with three forms of engagement (i.e., voting, volunteering, and collective action). Thus, to develop the conceptual model for the present study (see Table 1 ), three sets of factors were taken from the Cicognani and Zani (2015) model; these were expected to predict the four forms of supranational (dis)engagement differently, based on the theorizing of Barrett (2015) . Demographic variables (gender, age, and immigrant status) were included in the model. Cicognani, Zani, Fournier, Gavray, and Born (2012) found that males aged 15-19 years showed higher political interest and Internet political participation than females, but they did not find gender differences regarding voting intentions. Eckstein, Noack, and Gniewosz (2012) did not find gender differences regarding political engagement among adolescents attending school grades 7-11, but demonstrated that longitudinal trajectories differed depending on academic versus vocational school track. Civic and political engagement increase between late adolescence and early adulthood (e.g., Albanesi et al., 2015) . For immigrants, opportunity structures for conventional political engagement are usually constrained, because they are often not citizens in their country of residence even if they were born there (Montgomery, 2015) . However, Barrett and Zani (2015b) argue that immigrants do have alternative possibilities for engagement even if they have no right to vote in their country of residence. And indeed, immigrants in Italy from Morocco and Albania display higher levels of civic participation compared to their nonimmigrant Italian peers (Albanesi et al., 2015) , and higher levels of political attentiveness and political participation (excluding voting) are found among Turkish and Moroccan immigrant youth in Belgium than in nonimmigrant Belgian youth (Gavray, Born, & Fournier, 2015) . Goals were conceptualized as visions and worries for the long-term future of Europe instead of investigating personal goals as typically done in the literature . Because of the novelty of this study, it was necessary to develop a comprehensive and meaningful list of visions and worries.
Perceived power and influence were operationalized in terms of internal, external, and collective political efficacy. While internal political efficacy was defined as feeling knowledgeable and competent regarding EU issues, external political efficacy was defined as the belief that one's voice is heard and taken seriously by decision-makers at the European level (Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009) . Collective political efficacy (Bandura, 2000) was defined as the belief that young people as a group can successfully impact the future of Europe and political decisions on the European level. Although previous studies have revealed the importance of all three efficacy beliefs, internal efficacy tends to be the most consistent predictor of political and civic participation (Barrett, 2015; Brunton-Smith & Barrett, 2015) .
Research Questions
Data were collected in seven European countries from young people aged 16-25 years to answer the following three research questions (RQ):
RQ 1: What visions and worries do youth living in seven European countries have for the long-term future of Europe?
Because youths' long-term future visions and worries for Europe have never been investigated systematically before, it was necessary (1) to develop a comprehensive list of relevant topics and (2) to establish the factor structure of the new instrument.
RQ 2: Are there differences in visions and worries, engagement with the EU and efficacy beliefs depending on gender, age and immigrant status?
To investigate age differences between late adolescents and emerging adults, the youth were divided into two groups: 16-to 19-year-olds and 20-to 25-year-olds. The cut-off age of 19 was used because this is the average age of university entrance in most of the participating countries. Young people were categorized as first generation immigrants when their country of birth did not match their country of residence. It was hypothesized that age and gender are associated with the different forms of engagement with the EU, because of already documented differences in studies on general political engagement (Albanesi et al., 2015; Cicognani et al., 2012) . Because of the novelty of the present study, we did not formulate hypotheses regarding visions, worries, and efficacy beliefs.
RQ3: Do demographic variables, visions and worries, and efficacy beliefs predict the four forms of engagement with the EU differently?
We hypothesized that demographic variables, efficacy beliefs, visions, and worries would predict different forms of engagement for the EU differentially (Barrett, 2015) . As the data collection took place between April and December 2016, it was possible to split the sample into data collected before and after the Brexit referendum (June 23, 2016) and to control for this macro-level event in the analyses.
Method Study Design
As a first step, a qualitative pre-study was conducted with a minimum of five young persons aged 16-25 years in each of the seven European countries that were members of the Europe 2038 project. As a second step, a quantitative online survey was conducted. Besides the newly developed list of visions and worries for the future of Europe, three multinational subteams selected well-established scales to measure several additional constructs of interest. All selected scales, which were in English, were again reviewed by the other project members to shorten the final survey. The final survey was translated into six languages (in two countries the language was German) and back-translated by two independent bilingual team members. The final versions of the survey were available online between April/July (depending on country) and December 2016. 
Procedure
All necessary permits to conduct the study were obtained from local and national bodies and ethical committees of the project teams' universities. The goal was to collect data from a minimum of 250 young persons per country, equally divided by gender and age group (16-19 vs. 20-25 years). The sample was intended to ideally match other relevant national characteristics like educational background or immigrant status. Participants were recruited by advertising the online survey on several relevant national webpages, sending the link to teachers, social workers, and other professionals, advertising in newspapers, local radio stations, television, and during national events. Moreover, in Austria, Italy, and the UK, data were also collected in schools.
Measures
Demographic Information Information regarding gender, age, citizenship, country of birth, and country of residence was obtained. Participants were asked what best describes what they are currently doing: studying at school, studying at (tech) college or university, looking for a job, working full time, working part time, being in an apprenticeship or training scheme, not being in work or training or education, caring for a child or dependent, waiting for the processing of the asylum application, other.
Visions for Europe 2038
To assess future visions, the following instruction was given: Imagine that you are the head of the European Union and you could set priorities for Europe 2038. Which topics are the most important? Please also mark your top 5 priorities.
The 39 visions were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from "very important" (5) to "not at all important" (1) (see Results section for items).
Worries About Europe 2038
To assess future worries, the following instruction was given: Imagine yourself in 2038, which of the following things are you worried about? Please also indicate for each topic whether this is one of your top 5 worries. The 31 worries were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from "a lot" (5) to "not at all" (1) (see Results section for items).
Engagement With the EU Conventional political engagement was measured with one item "Will you vote in the European Union elections in 2019?" This item was not part of the survey in Albania and the UK, as Albania is currently not an EU member but a candidate country and data collection in the UK started after the Brexit referendum. Nonconventional political engagement was measured with six items (e.g., "Have you ever signed a petition about an issue regarding the European Union?"). Psychological engagement was measured with three items (e.g., "Do you follow news about the European Union on TV, the radio, or in newspapers?"). These items were inspired by the Processes Influencing Democratic Ownership and Participation (PIDOP) project (Barrett & Zani, 2015a) . Disengagement from the EU was measured with one item "Do you think your country should remain in the European Union?" Again, this item was not part of the survey in Albania and was not used for the UK in the present analyses. The answer format of all items was yes or no.
Efficacy Beliefs
Internal Efficacy was measured with three items (e.g., "I know more about European issues than most people of my age"). Collective Efficacy was measured with three items (e.g., "By working together young people can successfully influence the future of Europe"). External Efficacy was measured with three items (e.g., "The European Union is doing its best to find out about what young people in Europe want"). These items were inspired by the PIDOP project (Barrett & Zani, 2015a) and were answered on a 5-point rating scale ranging from "strongly agree" (5) to "strongly disagree" (1).
All items were presented randomly for each participant to avoid ordering effects.
Participants
After data cleaning, data of 3,764 young people aged 16-25 years were analyzed. Demographic characteristics are reported in Table 2 . Participants (2,361) were 16-19 years old and 1,403 were 20-25 years old; 1,499 were male and 2,252 were female. The sample size in the seven countries varied between 176 (Albania) and 1,385 (Austria). Unfortunately, it was not possible to collect representative data, with all demographic variables differing between the seven countries and for the two age groups. It is important to understand that differences between countries also reflect differences in educational systems. In Austria and Germany, a high proportion of 16-19-year-olds are in apprenticeship or training, while in the UK and Spain many attend college (instead of school). Data (45.9%) was collected pre-Brexit referendum and 54.9% post-Brexit referendum, and this variable was included in analyses.
Statistical Analyses
All measures were first tested for construct validity using SPSS. For each construct, we conducted a principal component analysis with oblique rotation. For factor extraction, we used the eigenvalue > 1 criterion to find the best interpretable solution. Further, we used Parallel analysis based on minimum rank factor analysis (Timmerman & Lorenzo-Seva, 2011) in R (package psych). To establish cross-country factorial invariance was not necessary, as we did not perform cross-national comparisons. Thus, data of the whole sample was used.
Univariate analyses were then conducted to investigate whether the demographic variables (gender, age, immigrant status) moderated the levels of visions, worries, engagement with the EU, and efficacy beliefs.
Finally, for each of the four engagement variables, blockwise (binary logistic) regression models were conducted. Block 1 contained the demographic variables. Block 2 contained the efficacy variables. Block 3 contained the visions for Europe 2038. Block 4 contained the worries for Europe 2038.
Results

Construct Validity of the Measures Visions for Europe 2038
Eight factors emerged with an eigenvalue > 1.00. Parallel analyses also suggested eight factors. The 8-factor structure was theoretically meaningful and explained 53.12% of the variance. There were no double loadings > 0.40 but eight items with loadings < 0.40 were excluded (art and design, urban development, globalization, freedom, health care, rural development, education, data security). Moreover, based on subsequent reliability analyses, three more items were excluded (religion, European army, increase in the number of EU member states). The final eight scales (28 items) that were internally consistent (Cronbach's α) were the following: Technology (technology, digitalization, communication and media, mobility, 4 items α = 0.74).
Human Rights (human rights, women's rights, LGBTQIA's rights, children's rights, inclusion of person with special needs, 5 items, α = 0.76). Reduction of the EU (decrease in the number of member states, return power to national governments, 2 items, α = 0.62; r = 0.45, p < .001).
Migration (immigration, refugees, 2 items, α = 0.69, r = 0.52, p < .001). Economic Challenges (financial crisis, economy, security, unemployment, 4 items, α = 0.67). Social cohesion (retirement and pensions, family policies, aging, social cohesion, social welfare, 5 items α = 0.68). Environment (environment, energy, nutrition, natural resources, 4 items, α = 0.67). EU policy (EU policy, increase the power of the European parliament, 2 items, α = 0.59, r = 0.43, p < .001).
Worries About Europe 2038
Six factors emerged with an eigenvalue > 1.00. Parallel analyses also suggested six factors. The 6-factor structure was theoretically meaningful and explained 57.07% of the variance. One item (prejudice, discrimination, and racism) had double loadings > 0.40 on two factors and two items had a loading < 0.40 and were excluded (countries going bankrupt, militarization at the European borders). The final six scales (28 items) all were internally consistent and were the following: Unemployment and Poverty (unemployment, poverty, gap between the rich and the poor, injustice, price rises, shortages of social services in Europe, corruption, 7 items, α = 0.81). Civil Unrests and Collapse of EU (religious and/or ethnic conflicts, war outside of Europe, rise of extreme right-wing parties, less solidarity in Europe, nationalism in Europe, civil unrest, collapse of the EU, restrictions and violence at the European borders, 8 items, α = 0.82). State Surveillances and Repressions (rise of state surveillance, state repression, 2 items, α = 0.62, r = 0.36, p < .001). Influx of Migrants (influxes of migrants and refugees, rise of extreme left-wing parties, α = 0.52, 2 items, r = 0.37, p < .001). Diseases and Violence (increase in diseases, unexpected disease epidemics, war in Europe, terrorism, violence and crime, sexual violence, dictatorship, 7 items, α = 0.84). Climate Change (climate change, environmental or natural disasters, 2 items, α = 0.62, r = 0.46, p < .001).
Engagement for the EU
A principal component analysis with oblique rotation with two fixed factors confirmed the 2-factor structure of the scale. The two emerging factors were theoretically meaningful, explained 45.77% of the variance, and coincided with the two subscales psychological engagement (3 items, α = 0.55) and nonconventional political engagement (6 items, α = 0.66).
Efficacy Beliefs
A principal component analysis with oblique rotation with three fixed factors was conducted for the nine items assessing efficacy. The 3-factor structure was interpretable and theoretically meaningful and explained 62.55% of the variance. Two recoded items had factor loadings < 0.40 and low reliabilities and were excluded from further analyses. Thus, internal efficacy (α = 0.72, r = 0.57, p < .001) and external efficacy (α = 0.75, r = 0.60, p < .001) consisted of two items. Collective efficacy consisted of three items (α = 0.82).
Visions and Worries for the Future of Europe (RQ1)
As shown in Table 3 , gender and age differences (16-19 vs. 20-25 years) regarding the eight visions and six worries emerged. Few differences based on immigrant status were found.
Visions for Europe 2038
Females rated human rights, migration, economy, and social cohesion as more important than men, who rated technology and the reduction of the EU more important than did females. Sixteen-to 19-year-olds rated technology, human rights, reduction of the EU, economy, and EU policy more important than 20-to 25-year-olds, who rated migration and social cohesion as more important than younger youths. First generation immigrants (M = 4.22, SD = 0.61) rated economy as less important than did nonimmigrants [M = 4.30, SD = 0.59, t(3,133) = 2.29, p = .02, d = 0.15].
Worries About Europe 2038
Except for migration where there were no gender differences, females worried more than men. Sixteen-to 19-year-olds were more worried about migration, diseases, and violence compared with 20-to 25-year-olds who were more worried about civil unrests and the collapse of the EU. 
Engagement With the EU and Efficacy Beliefs (RQ2)
As shown in Table 4 , several gender and age differences (16-19 vs. 20-25 years) emerged; few differences based on immigrant status were found.
Engagement With the EU
Fewer males than females intended to vote in the 2019 EU election, but more males than females wanted their country to leave the EU. Males also indicated higher nonconventional participation with the EU than did females. Twenty-to 25-year-olds indicated higher levels of nonconventional political and psychological engagement than 16-to 19-year-olds, who were more in favor of their country leaving the EU compared to 20-to 25-year-olds. Notes. Theoretical range of the answers: nonconventional political participation 0-6; psychological engagement with EU issues 0-3; efficacy beliefs 1-5. Because of varying sample size per item df ranged between 3,232 and 3,210. *p < .05, **p < .01, ns p > .05.
Efficacy Beliefs
Males had higher internal and external efficacy beliefs than females who had higher collective efficacy beliefs than men. Sixteen-to 19-year-olds had higher levels of collective and external efficacy beliefs than 20-to 25-year-olds. No differences depending on immigrant status were found.
Prediction of Engagement With the EU (RQ3)
The results of the final model (including all four blocks) are presented in Table 5 . The explained variance for intended voting was 5.8% but ranged between 16.5 and 20.5% for the other forms of engagement.
Intended Voting in the 2019 EU Elections
Block-wise binary logistic regression models were conducted. The block 1 variables explained less than 1%, adding block 2 variables explained 2.8%, adding block 3 variables explained 5.4%, and adding block 4 variables explained 5.8% of the variance. Young people who intended to vote in the next EU election took part in the study before Brexit, were more often females, had higher levels of knowledge about the EU (i.e., higher internal efficacy), prioritized economic challenges more, but the reduction of the EU less. They were more worried about civil unrest and the collapse of the EU.
Nonconventional Political Engagement
Block-wise linear regression models were conducted. The block 1 variables explained 5.1%, adding block 2 variables Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2017), 225(4), 313-323 Ó 2017 Hogrefe Publishing explained 18.2%, adding block 3 variables explained 19.6%, and adding block 4 variables explained 20.5% of the variance. Young people with higher levels of nonconventional political participation took part in the study after Brexit, were more likely to be 20-to 25-year-olds, had higher levels of knowledge about the EU, but prioritized economic challenges less than those with lower levels of nonconventional political participation. Moreover, they were less worried about disease and violence, but more worried about state surveillance and repression.
Psychological Engagement With EU Issues
Block-wise linear regression models were conducted. The block 1 variables explained 4.2%, adding block 2 variables explained 14.7%, adding block 3 variables explained 19.1%, and adding block 4 variables explained 20.1% of the variance. Young people with higher levels of psychological engagement were more likely to be 20-to 25-year-olds. They had higher levels of knowledge about the EU (i.e., higher internal efficacy), but perceived lower levels of interest by the EU in young people's voice (i.e., lower external efficacy). They prioritized the reduction of the EU less, but the visions of economic challenges and migration more. They were more worried about civil unrests and the collapse of the EU and were less worried about disease and violence.
Own Country Should Leave the EU Block-wise binary logistic regression models were conducted. The block 1 variables explained 1.6%, adding block 2 variables explained 4.9%, adding block 3 variables explained 13.6%, and adding block 4 variables explained 16.5% of the variance. Young people who wanted their own country to leave the EU were more likely to participate in the study before Brexit, were more often males than females, had higher levels of knowledge about the EU, but perceived lower levels of interest by the EU in young people's voice, prioritized the reduction of the EU more, but economic challenges and EU policy less. Furthermore, they worried more about unemployment, poverty, and the influx of migrants but less about civil unrest and EU collapse.
Discussion
The main goals of the present study were: (1) to find out which long-term visions and worries young people had for the future of Europe, and (2) to investigate whether demographic variables, visions, worries, and efficacy beliefs were associated with engagement with the EU.
Young People's Visions and Worries for the Future of Europe
Economic challenges, human rights, and environment emerged as the most important long-term future visions, while unemployment and poverty, climate change, civil unrests, and the collapse of the EU were youth's most important long-term future worries. There was a gender gap for human rights, indicating that this topic was more important for females. Overall, females worried more about the future of Europe compared to males as indicated in their higher levels in five out of six worry scales. This finding might be explained by gender differences in anxiety levels of females compared to males (Duchesne & Ratelle, 2016) . Interestingly, 16-to 19-year-olds scored higher in six out of eight vision scales compared to 20-to 25-year-olds. It is possible that the older youths are more realistic about how difficult it is to realize visions, and were therefore more cautious. Environment was an equally important vision for both age groups, but civil unrest and the collapse of the EU were more worrisome for the 20-to 25-year-olds. It is possible that older youths are more aware of the possible consequences of a collapse of the EU compared with younger ones who might take the existence of the EU for granted. First generation immigrants prioritized economic challenges less and worried less about the influx of migrants and uncontrollable events compared to their nonimmigrant peers. These results make sense as first generation immigrants are more aware of the positive sides of immigration compared to their nonimmigrant peers. Moreover, they might have already coped with many challenges during migration and therefore might worry less about disease and violence.
Levels of Young People's Engagement With the EU
When looking at the young people's engagement, an interesting pattern emerged. The levels of intended voting and psychological engagement were relatively high, while the levels of nonconventional political engagement and the wish that one's own country should leave the EU were relatively low. In line with the existing literature (Cicognani et al., 2012) , males had higher levels of nonconventional political participation with the EU than females. However, males had lower levels of intended voting in the next EU elections and wanted their country to leave the EU more. We found that, compared to females, males prioritized the reduction of the EU as a future vision for Europe more, and were more disengaged from the EU (see Barrett, 2015) . Our analyses revealed that 16-to 19-year-olds had lower levels of psychological and nonconventional political engagement but wanted their country to leave the EU more than 20-to 25-year-olds. Although there were no age differences regarding intended voting, overall 16-to 19-year-olds were more disengaged from the EU than older youths. It is possible that younger people had fewer possibilities to engage, as schools often do not foster political and civic engagement (Eckstein et al., 2012) . Consistent with their constraint opportunities as non-EU citizens and with existing studies (Albanesi et al., 2015; Gavray et al., 2015; Montgomery, 2015) , first generation immigrants had lower levels of intended voting in the next EU elections, but higher levels of nonconventional political engagement with the EU.
Prediction of Young People's Engagement With the EU
According to the theorizing of Barrett (2015) and our conceptual model, the four different forms of engagement with the EU were predicted differently by demographic variables, visions, worries, and efficacy beliefs. Although several visions and worries were predictive for all forms of engagement, our data show that future visions are especially important to better understand conventional political participation and why young people want their country to leave the EU.
Young people who wanted their own country to leave the EU are probably the most interesting group. It is possible that these individuals faced several strains in their lives (e.g., unemployment), and were therefore unable to recognize possible benefits of the EU for themselves or for their country.
Our findings also show that macro-level events like the Brexit referendum are associated with the political engagement of young people and that these effects might work differently for conventional and nonconventional political engagement. For nonconventional and psychological engagement, internal efficacy (i.e., knowledge about EU) was the strongest predictor indicating that the perceived level of knowledge is important for young people to get active. It is likely that young people who take actions, worry less about disease and violence that might happen in the future (Bandura, 2000) .
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Unfortunately, it was not possible to collect longitudinal representative data. Instead, a convenience concurrent sample answered an online survey resulting in different sample sizes and uneven distributions of all demographic variables. Because the results would be very difficult to interpret, we decided to not perform country-level comparisons. Moreover, some scales had rather low internal consistencies and should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Future studies might enlarge the scope of the theoretical model by including more variables at different levels of analysis . Moreover, to apply person-centered statistical analyses is highly recommended in future studies to discover differently engaged groups of young people (Amnå & Ekman, 2015) .
The present study clearly indicates that the EU needs to listen to the voices of young people, who articulated important visions for the future of Europe. Overall, to combine a strong economy with human rights and environment should be fostered by EU decision-makers even more in the future.
